Oswaldo Porchat: rústico ou urbano?
Data
2023-12-04
Autores
Abreu, André Vasques de 
Tipo
Dissertação de mestrado
Título da Revista
ISSN da Revista
Título de Volume
Resumo
A interpretação e apropriação do pirronismo antigo por parte de Oswaldo Porchat é aqui examinada à luz do debate entre as interpretações urbana e rústica do ceticismo. Em 1982, Jonathan Barnes caracterizou as duas posições presentes nesse debate e estabeleceu os termos que até então são usados para se referir a ele. Enquanto a interpretação de Michael Frede (1979) se tornou a principal representante da primeira posição, chamada de interpretação urbana, a interpretação Myles Burnyeat (1980) se tornou a referência da segunda posição, chamada de interpretação rústica. Segundo a interpretação urbana, a suspensão do juízo não atinge as crenças do homem comum, mas somente as crenças filosóficas. Isso significa que o cético poderia ter crenças não filosóficas. Segundo a interpretação rústica, a suspensão do juízo atinge toda e qualquer crença humana, seja ela filosófica ou não filosófica. O cético, portanto, não teria nenhuma crença. Contudo, em 2000, Gail Fine sugeriu que não haveria diferença entre essas duas posições. No fundo, Frede e Burnyeat compartilhariam da ideia de que o cético não tem nenhuma crença. Porchat não manifestou explicitamente sua posição acerca dessa controvérsia. Por isso, não sabemos exatamente qual a sua interpretação da abrangência da suspensão do juízo no pirronismo antigo, nem mesmo qual concepção da abrangência da suspensão do juízo está presente no seu neopirronismo. Esta dissertação, portanto, tem dois objetivos: 1) compreender se Porchat tinha uma interpretação rústica ou urbana do pirronismo antigo; 2) compreender se Porchat tinha uma concepção rústica ou urbana de neopirronismo. Além disso, é preciso levar em conta a hipótese de que Porchat tenha evoluído de uma posição a outra, e a hipótese de que o neopirronismo de Porchat tenha superado a dicotomia entre ceticismo urbano e ceticismo rústico, formulando uma versão original de ceticismo. Para atingir esses objetivos, analisamos, sobretudo, os artigos que Porchat publicou entre 1969 e 1995.
The interpretation and appropriation of ancient Pyrrhonism by Oswaldo Porchat are examined here in the light of the debate between the urbane and rustic interpretations of skepticism. In 1982, Jonathan Barnes characterized the two positions present in this debate and established the terms that have been used since then to refer to it. While Michael Frede's interpretation (1979) became the main representative of the first position, called the urbane interpretation, Myles Burnyeat's interpretation (1980) became the reference for the second position, called the rustic interpretation. According to the urbane interpretation, the suspension of judgment does not affect the beliefs of the common men, but only philosophical beliefs. This means that the skeptic could have non-philosophical beliefs. According to the rustic interpretation, the suspension of judgment affects every human belief, whether philosophical or non-philosophical. The skeptic, therefore, would have no beliefs. However, in 2000, Gail Fine suggested that there would be no difference between these two positions. In essence, Frede and Burnyeat would share the idea that the skeptic has no beliefs. Porchat did not explicitly express his position on this controversy. Therefore, we do not know exactly what his interpretation of the scope of the suspension of judgment in ancient Pyrrhonism is, nor even what conception of the scope of the suspension of judgment is present in his neo-Pyrrhonism. This dissertation, therefore, has two objectives: 1) to understand whether Porchat had an urbane or rustic interpretation of ancient Pyrrhonism; 2) to understand whether Porchat had an urbane or rustic conception of neo-Pyrrhonism. In addition, it is necessary to take into account the hypothesis that Porchat may have evolved from one position to another and the hypothesis that Porchat's neo-Pyrrhonism may have overcome the dichotomy between urbane skepticism and rustic skepticism, formulating an original version of skepticism. To achieve these objectives, we analyze, especially, the articles that Porchat published between 1969 and 1995.
The interpretation and appropriation of ancient Pyrrhonism by Oswaldo Porchat are examined here in the light of the debate between the urbane and rustic interpretations of skepticism. In 1982, Jonathan Barnes characterized the two positions present in this debate and established the terms that have been used since then to refer to it. While Michael Frede's interpretation (1979) became the main representative of the first position, called the urbane interpretation, Myles Burnyeat's interpretation (1980) became the reference for the second position, called the rustic interpretation. According to the urbane interpretation, the suspension of judgment does not affect the beliefs of the common men, but only philosophical beliefs. This means that the skeptic could have non-philosophical beliefs. According to the rustic interpretation, the suspension of judgment affects every human belief, whether philosophical or non-philosophical. The skeptic, therefore, would have no beliefs. However, in 2000, Gail Fine suggested that there would be no difference between these two positions. In essence, Frede and Burnyeat would share the idea that the skeptic has no beliefs. Porchat did not explicitly express his position on this controversy. Therefore, we do not know exactly what his interpretation of the scope of the suspension of judgment in ancient Pyrrhonism is, nor even what conception of the scope of the suspension of judgment is present in his neo-Pyrrhonism. This dissertation, therefore, has two objectives: 1) to understand whether Porchat had an urbane or rustic interpretation of ancient Pyrrhonism; 2) to understand whether Porchat had an urbane or rustic conception of neo-Pyrrhonism. In addition, it is necessary to take into account the hypothesis that Porchat may have evolved from one position to another and the hypothesis that Porchat's neo-Pyrrhonism may have overcome the dichotomy between urbane skepticism and rustic skepticism, formulating an original version of skepticism. To achieve these objectives, we analyze, especially, the articles that Porchat published between 1969 and 1995.