O filosófico e o não filosófico: A especificidade da filosofia em Thompson Clarke e em Barry Stroud
Data
2022-09-14
Autores
Bôas, Israel Meneses Santos Vilas 
Orientadores
Smith, Plínio Junqueira
Tipo
Dissertação de mestrado
Título da Revista
ISSN da Revista
Título de Volume
Resumo
Esta dissertação tem como objetivo compreender e apresentar o sentido das críticas filosóficas que Thompson Morgan Clarke faz à epistemologia tradicional e à filosofia tradicional. Essa compreensão e essa apresentação se fazem necessárias devido à obscuridade dos textos de Clarke, obscuridade que leva a uma lacuna historiográfica: Clarke é conhecido sobretudo pelos textos filosóficos de outras pessoas que, influenciadas profundamente por ele, lhe agradecem em seus livros e artigos e atribuem a ele as suas ideias filosóficas, ou os seus modos de ver os conceitos, a filosofia, o conhecimento, a verdade etc. No entanto, pouco trabalho de exegese foi dedicado à obra de Clarke em si mesma. Esta dissertação tem, ainda, o objetivo de comparar a filosofia de Clarke com a filosofia de Barry Stroud, um filósofo muito parecido com Clarke e profundamente influenciado por ele, mas que segue seu próprio caminho analítico e teórico, a fim de mostrar como a filosofia de Clarke se diferencia muito mesmo da filosofia de seu pupilo mais próximo geográfica e conceitualmente. Para concretizar esses objetivos, articular-se-ão três capítulos: o primeiro se dedica a expor a filosofia de Clarke com o máximo de exatidão possível; o segundo se dedica a expor a filosofia de Barry Stroud com o máximo de exatidão possível; o terceiro visa a compará-las a fim de mostrar em que grau se assemelham, bem como que características têm essas semelhanças. O ideal regulador dessa comparação consiste em que, mesmo que Clarke e Stroud concordassem por completo quanto aos fatos das questões que examinam, ainda poderiam tirar conclusões diferentes desses fatos, e em que a diferença entre as suas conclusões nem sempre é facilmente identificável. Apesar da fidelidade da exposição que se visa a fazer da filosofia dos dois autores, não se analisa toda a filosofia de ambos, mas se focaliza a sua teoria do conhecimento com exposições de suas filosofias de outras áreas quando necessário. A teoria do conhecimento clarkeana, em suas duas versões, por exemplo, contém em seu núcleo reflexões profundas quanto à natureza da lógica e da linguagem, bem como usa já uma versão dessas reflexões como refutação de pretensamente todas as versões da tese dos dados dos sentidos, já a outra versão como refutação de todas quase todas as filosofias. É necessário, por conseguinte, descrever essas reflexões não epistemológicas para que a sua epistemologia seja efetivamente explicada.
This dissertation aims to understand and present the meaning of Thompson Morgan Clarke’s philosophical critiques of traditional epistemology and traditional philosophy. This understanding and this presentation are necessary due to Clarke’s texts' obscurity. This obscurity leads to a historiographical gap: Clarke is known mainly by the philosophical texts of other people who, deeply influenced by him, thank him in his books and articles and attribute to him their philosophical ideas or ways of seeing concepts, philosophy, knowledge, truth, etc. However, little exegetical work has been devoted to Clarke’s work itself. This dissertation also aims to compare Clarke’s philosophy with the philosophy of Barry Stroud, a philosopher very similar to Clarke and deeply influenced by him, but who follows his own analytical and theoretical path, in order to show how Clarke’s philosophy differs a lot even from the philosophy of his closest pupil geographically and conceptually. To concretise these objectives, three chapters will be articulated: the first is dedicated to expose Clarke’s philosophy as accurately as possible; the second is dedicated to expose Barry Stroud’s philosophy as accurately as possible; the third aims to compare their philosophies in order to show to what degree they resemble each other, as well as what features these resemblances have. The regulative ideal of this comparison is that, even if Clarke and Stroud were to agree entirely on the facts of the matters they examine, they would still draw different conclusions from those facts, as well that the difference between their conclusions may not always be easily identifiable. Despite the fidelity of the exposition that one aims to make of the philosophy of the two authors, one does not analyse the whole philosophy of both authors but focuses on their theory of knowledge with expositions of their philosophies from other areas when necessary. The Clarkean theory of knowledge, in its two versions, for example, contains, at its core, deep reflections as to the nature of logic and language, as well as using either one version of these reflections as a refutation of supposedly all versions of the sense-data thesis, or the other version as a refutation of almost all philosophies. It is, therefore, necessary to describe these non-epistemological reflections if his epistemology is to be effectively explained.
This dissertation aims to understand and present the meaning of Thompson Morgan Clarke’s philosophical critiques of traditional epistemology and traditional philosophy. This understanding and this presentation are necessary due to Clarke’s texts' obscurity. This obscurity leads to a historiographical gap: Clarke is known mainly by the philosophical texts of other people who, deeply influenced by him, thank him in his books and articles and attribute to him their philosophical ideas or ways of seeing concepts, philosophy, knowledge, truth, etc. However, little exegetical work has been devoted to Clarke’s work itself. This dissertation also aims to compare Clarke’s philosophy with the philosophy of Barry Stroud, a philosopher very similar to Clarke and deeply influenced by him, but who follows his own analytical and theoretical path, in order to show how Clarke’s philosophy differs a lot even from the philosophy of his closest pupil geographically and conceptually. To concretise these objectives, three chapters will be articulated: the first is dedicated to expose Clarke’s philosophy as accurately as possible; the second is dedicated to expose Barry Stroud’s philosophy as accurately as possible; the third aims to compare their philosophies in order to show to what degree they resemble each other, as well as what features these resemblances have. The regulative ideal of this comparison is that, even if Clarke and Stroud were to agree entirely on the facts of the matters they examine, they would still draw different conclusions from those facts, as well that the difference between their conclusions may not always be easily identifiable. Despite the fidelity of the exposition that one aims to make of the philosophy of the two authors, one does not analyse the whole philosophy of both authors but focuses on their theory of knowledge with expositions of their philosophies from other areas when necessary. The Clarkean theory of knowledge, in its two versions, for example, contains, at its core, deep reflections as to the nature of logic and language, as well as using either one version of these reflections as a refutation of supposedly all versions of the sense-data thesis, or the other version as a refutation of almost all philosophies. It is, therefore, necessary to describe these non-epistemological reflections if his epistemology is to be effectively explained.