Governança corporativa e desempenho econômico: uma avaliação para empresas listadas na B3 utilizando modelos dinâmicos com dados em painel
Data
27-05-21
Autores
Santos, Kárita Allen Pereira dos [UNIFESP]
Orientadores
Maciel, Leandro dos Santos [UNIFESP]
Tipo
Dissertação de mestrado
Título da Revista
ISSN da Revista
Título de Volume
Resumo
A adesão de melhores práticas de governança corporativa, como instrumento para reduzir os impactos negativos dos conflitos de agência, tem ganhado destaque dentre as empresas, sobretudo para as que têm ações negociadas em bolsas de valores. No Brasil, o crescimento da adesão a níveis diferenciados de governança da B3 evidencia o interesse das firmas nos benefícios de uma melhor estrutura de governança, que visa aprimorar a gestão empresarial por meio de um maior disclousure das suas operações, assim como na transparente divulgação dos resultados econômicos e financeiros aos acionistas. Este estudo analisou a influência da adesão voluntária aos diferentes segmentos de governança da B3, Nível 1 (N1), Nível 2 (N2) e Novo Mercado, sobre o desempenho econômico das companhias, medido pelos respectivos q’s de Tobin e pelo market-to-book (MB) ratios. A hipótese deste trabalho avalia se elevados níveis de governança corporativa tendem a agregar maior valor às firmas, em decorrência de um melhor desempenho das operações, como consequência da redução dos custos de agência associados. Com base em uma amostra de 220 empresas, com dados anuais para o período de 2010 a 2019, a estratégia econométrica utilizada considerou modelos dinâmicos de dados em painel a fim de verificar os principais fatores explicativos que impactam os resultados econômicos das firmas com ações na B3, sendo o efeito governança mensurado por variáveis dummies. Os resultados indicaram que a listagem diferenciada nos níveis N2 e NM tem impacto positivo e significativo sobre as medidas de desempenho econômico (q de Tobin e MB ratio), em linha com o pressuposto teórico da Teoria da Agência, em que uma melhor governança reduz os impactos negativos dos conflitos de interesses entre gestores e acionistas. Porém, quando controlados efeitos de endogeneidade, os resultados indicaram que a variável que captura o efeito governança corporativa não é significativa para explicar a capacidade de geração de valor das firmas que atuam na B3, não confirmando, assim, a hipótese inicial de pesquisa. Conclui-se que a governança corporativa não tem impacto significativo sobre o desempenho das empresas quando se considera efeitos de endogeneidade nas análises, o que difere dos resultados em muitos estudos empíricos em finanças corporativas que desconsideram esse aspecto em seus modelos.
The adoption of best corporate governance practices, as an instrument to reduce the negative impacts of agency conflicts, has gained prominence among companies, especially for those that have shares traded on stock exchanges. In Brazil, the growth of adherence to differentiated levels of governance at B3 demonstrates the interest of firms in the benefits of a better governance structure, which aims to improve business management through greater disclosure of their operations, as well as the transparent disclosure of economic and financial results to shareholders. This study analyzed the influence of voluntary adherence to the different governance segments of B3, Level 1 (L1), Level 2 (L2) and Novo Mercado (NM), on the economic performance of companies, measured by the respective Tobin q's and by the market-to-book (MB) ratios. The hypothesis of this work assesses whether high levels of corporate governance tend to add greater value to firms, as a result of better operations performance, as a consequence of the reduction in associated agency costs. Based on a sample of 220 companies, with annual data for the period 2010 to 2019, the econometric strategy used considered dynamic panel data models in order to verify the main explanatory factors that impact the economic results of firms with shares in B3, with the governance effect being measured by dummy variables. The results indicated that the differentiated listing at levels N2 and NM has a positive and significant impact on measures of economic performance (Tobin's q and MB ratio), in line with the theoretical assumption of Agency Theory, in which better governance reduces negative impacts of conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. However, when controlling for endogeneity effects, the results indicated that the variable that captures the corporate governance effect is not significant to explain the value generation capacity of firms operating in B3, thus not confirming the initial research hypothesis. It is concluded that corporate governance does not have a significant impact on the performance of companies when considering endogeneity effects in the analyses, which differs from the results of many empirical studies on corporate finance that disregard this aspect in their models.
The adoption of best corporate governance practices, as an instrument to reduce the negative impacts of agency conflicts, has gained prominence among companies, especially for those that have shares traded on stock exchanges. In Brazil, the growth of adherence to differentiated levels of governance at B3 demonstrates the interest of firms in the benefits of a better governance structure, which aims to improve business management through greater disclosure of their operations, as well as the transparent disclosure of economic and financial results to shareholders. This study analyzed the influence of voluntary adherence to the different governance segments of B3, Level 1 (L1), Level 2 (L2) and Novo Mercado (NM), on the economic performance of companies, measured by the respective Tobin q's and by the market-to-book (MB) ratios. The hypothesis of this work assesses whether high levels of corporate governance tend to add greater value to firms, as a result of better operations performance, as a consequence of the reduction in associated agency costs. Based on a sample of 220 companies, with annual data for the period 2010 to 2019, the econometric strategy used considered dynamic panel data models in order to verify the main explanatory factors that impact the economic results of firms with shares in B3, with the governance effect being measured by dummy variables. The results indicated that the differentiated listing at levels N2 and NM has a positive and significant impact on measures of economic performance (Tobin's q and MB ratio), in line with the theoretical assumption of Agency Theory, in which better governance reduces negative impacts of conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. However, when controlling for endogeneity effects, the results indicated that the variable that captures the corporate governance effect is not significant to explain the value generation capacity of firms operating in B3, thus not confirming the initial research hypothesis. It is concluded that corporate governance does not have a significant impact on the performance of companies when considering endogeneity effects in the analyses, which differs from the results of many empirical studies on corporate finance that disregard this aspect in their models.