A estrutura submersa: a ontologia realista de P. F. Strawson
Data
2024
Autores
Leones, André Luiz Ponce 
Tipo
Dissertação de mestrado
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Resumo
Esta dissertação tem por objetivo qualificar a ontologia realista de Peter Frederick Strawson. Para tanto, partimos do projeto de metafísica descritiva proposto na obra "Indivíduos: um ensaio de metafísica descritiva". No primeiro capítulo, a partir de uma abordagem panorâmica da primeira parte dessa obra, fixamo-nos no papel desempenhado pelos particulares básicos — corpos materiais e pessoas — na estrutura do esquema conceitual. Em seguida, analisamos a utilização por Strawson de argumentos transcendentais para fundamentar a proeminência dos particulares básicos nesse esquema. No terceiro capítulo, debruçamo-nos sobre as críticas feitas por Barry Stroud ao uso dos argumentos transcendentais em "Indivíduos". Para ele, esses argumentos seriam uma malfadada estratégia anticética que redundaria em uma espécie de verificacionismo. Para fazer frente à leitura de Stroud, recorremos às réplicas de P. M. S. Hacker e Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira. Cada qual a seu modo, Hacker e Pereira reiteram que o objetivo principal de Strawson em Indivíduos não era refutar quaisquer ceticismos, mas, sim, elucidar as interconexões que constituem o nosso esquema conceitual, ou seja, delinear uma ontologia realista em consonância com seu projeto de metafísica descritiva. No entanto, anos depois, Strawson concordou com algumas das críticas feitas por Stroud. No quarto e último capítulo, examinamos o teor dessa anuência parcial bem como do “naturalismo social” proposto por Strawson na fase final de sua trajetória filosófica. Procuramos mostrar que, não obstante eventuais problemas e limitações, tanto os argumentos transcendentais quanto o “naturalismo social” servem ao projeto de uma metafisica descritiva, visando elucidar o esquema conceitual e trazer à tona a estrutura submersa que caracterizaria a nossa ontologia.
This dissertation aims to qualify Peter Frederick Strawson's realist ontology. To do so, we start from the descriptive metaphysics project proposed in the book Individuals – An essay in descriptive metaphysics. In the first chapter, based on a panoramic approach to the first part of the aforementioned book, we focus on the role played by basic particulars — material bodies and persons — in supporting the conceptual scheme. Next, we analyze Strawson's use of transcendental arguments to substantiate the prominence of basic particulars in such a scheme. In the third chapter, we look at the criticisms made by Barry Stroud regarding the use of transcendental arguments in Individuals: for him, these arguments would be an ill-fated anti-skeptical strategy that would result in a type of verificationism. To counter Stroud's reading, we resort to the replies by P. M. S. Hacker and Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira. Each in their own way, Hacker and Pereira reiterate that Strawson's main objective in Individuals was not to refute any skepticism, but rather to elucidate the interconnections that represent our conceptual scheme, that is, to outline a realistic ontology in line with his project of descriptive metaphysics. However, years later, Strawson agreed with some of the criticisms made by Stroud. In the fourth and final chapter, we examine the content of this partial agreement as well as the “social naturalism” proposed by Strawson in the final phase of his philosophical trajectory. We seek to demonstrate that, despite possible problems, both transcendental arguments and “social naturalism” are in line with the project of descriptive metaphysics, elucidate the conceptual scheme and bring to light the submerged structure that would characterize our ontology.
This dissertation aims to qualify Peter Frederick Strawson's realist ontology. To do so, we start from the descriptive metaphysics project proposed in the book Individuals – An essay in descriptive metaphysics. In the first chapter, based on a panoramic approach to the first part of the aforementioned book, we focus on the role played by basic particulars — material bodies and persons — in supporting the conceptual scheme. Next, we analyze Strawson's use of transcendental arguments to substantiate the prominence of basic particulars in such a scheme. In the third chapter, we look at the criticisms made by Barry Stroud regarding the use of transcendental arguments in Individuals: for him, these arguments would be an ill-fated anti-skeptical strategy that would result in a type of verificationism. To counter Stroud's reading, we resort to the replies by P. M. S. Hacker and Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira. Each in their own way, Hacker and Pereira reiterate that Strawson's main objective in Individuals was not to refute any skepticism, but rather to elucidate the interconnections that represent our conceptual scheme, that is, to outline a realistic ontology in line with his project of descriptive metaphysics. However, years later, Strawson agreed with some of the criticisms made by Stroud. In the fourth and final chapter, we examine the content of this partial agreement as well as the “social naturalism” proposed by Strawson in the final phase of his philosophical trajectory. We seek to demonstrate that, despite possible problems, both transcendental arguments and “social naturalism” are in line with the project of descriptive metaphysics, elucidate the conceptual scheme and bring to light the submerged structure that would characterize our ontology.
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Citação
Leones, André Luiz Ponce