Linguagem e verdade: uma análise da lógica de Frege
Arquivos
Data
2014-06
Autores
Cardoso, Luciano Carvalho 
Orientadores
Carvalho, Marcelo Silva de
Tipo
Dissertação de mestrado
Título da Revista
ISSN da Revista
Título de Volume
Resumo
Em “Sobre o Sentido e a Referência”, Frege anuncia uma ruptura com
seus trabalhos anteriores, notadamente a Conceitografia, na qual ele havia
assumido que a igualdade era referente aos nomes e sinais representativos
dos objetos. Como consequência dessa negação, Frege apresenta a estrutura
de Sentido e Referência, como alternativa às possibilidades anteriormente
apresentadas. Em decorrência dessa ruptura, a dimensão da filosofia analítica
desenvolvida por Frege se amplia, revelando um complexo sistema no qual o
verdadeiro se torna o ponto fundamental. Mostramos que, no processo de
reformulação do significado do verdadeiro, Frege diferencia, ainda nos
Fundamentos da Aritmética, o domínio do campo objetivo efetivo do campo
objetivo não-efetivo, espaço lógico no qual as leis do ser verdadeiro encontram
lugar como referência para as proposições que expressam o pensamento
analítico. Visamos demonstrar que, partindo dessa fundamentação inicial, o
autor almeja estabelecer uma conexão ontológica entre o pensamento e as leis
do ser verdadeiro, o que lhe permite distinguir, em “Sobre o Sentido e
Referência”, o pensamento que expressa uma representação ou ideia,
pertencente ao domínio subjetivo, do pensamento que expressa as leis do ser
verdadeiro, e que podem ser transmitidas em gerações, por pertencerem ao
domínio objetivo não-efetivo. Buscamos estabelecer uma conexão entre essas
diretrizes e a concepção de pensamento fregiano, justificando a composição
deste como sendo uma estrutura que atende ao princípio de saturação, que
não se articula na forma sujeito/predicado e que, para poder atender à
necessidade lógica de passar do sentido para a referência e ser nomeado
como o verdadeiro, se articula com a lógica extensional e, em um sentido ainda
mais intrínseco, com uma lógica da existência, que surge como a estrutura
basilar na qual se fundamenta o juízo, e sem o qual não poderia haver a
validação ontológica do pensamento analítico de Frege.
In “On Sense and Reference”, Frege announces a break with his previous works, notably Ideography, in which he had assumed that equality was referring to the names and signals representative of the objects. As a result of this denial, Frege presents the structure of Sense and Reference, as an alternative to possibilities previously presented. Due to this break, the dimension of analytic philosophy developed by Frege expands, revealing a complex system in which the true becomes the key point. We show that, in the process of recasting the meaning of true, Frege differentiates, still in the Foundations of Arithmetic, the domain of effective objective field of the noneffective objective field , the logical space in which the laws of true being has a place as a reference to the propositions expressing analytical thinking. We aim to demonstrate that, based on this initial foundation, the author aims to establish an ontological connection between the thought and the laws of true being, allowing him to distinguish, in “On Sense and Reference”, the thought that expresses an idea or representation, belonging to subjective realm, of thought which expresses the laws of true being, and that can be transmitted in generations, because they belong to the non-effective objective field. We strive to establish a connection between these guidelines and the conception of fregian thought, justifying the composition of this as being a structure that follows the principle of saturation, which is not articulated in the form subject / predicate, and that in order to meet the logical necessity of moving beyond of sense to reference and be named as the true, articulates with the extensional logic and, in a more intrinsic meaning , with a logic of existence that emerges as the framework in which the judgment is based , and without which it could not be the ontological validation of analytical thinking Frege.
In “On Sense and Reference”, Frege announces a break with his previous works, notably Ideography, in which he had assumed that equality was referring to the names and signals representative of the objects. As a result of this denial, Frege presents the structure of Sense and Reference, as an alternative to possibilities previously presented. Due to this break, the dimension of analytic philosophy developed by Frege expands, revealing a complex system in which the true becomes the key point. We show that, in the process of recasting the meaning of true, Frege differentiates, still in the Foundations of Arithmetic, the domain of effective objective field of the noneffective objective field , the logical space in which the laws of true being has a place as a reference to the propositions expressing analytical thinking. We aim to demonstrate that, based on this initial foundation, the author aims to establish an ontological connection between the thought and the laws of true being, allowing him to distinguish, in “On Sense and Reference”, the thought that expresses an idea or representation, belonging to subjective realm, of thought which expresses the laws of true being, and that can be transmitted in generations, because they belong to the non-effective objective field. We strive to establish a connection between these guidelines and the conception of fregian thought, justifying the composition of this as being a structure that follows the principle of saturation, which is not articulated in the form subject / predicate, and that in order to meet the logical necessity of moving beyond of sense to reference and be named as the true, articulates with the extensional logic and, in a more intrinsic meaning , with a logic of existence that emerges as the framework in which the judgment is based , and without which it could not be the ontological validation of analytical thinking Frege.
Descrição
Citação
CARDOSO, Luciano Carvalho. Linguagem e verdade: uma análise da lógica de Frege. 2014. 98 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) – Escola de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas, Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP), Guarulhos, 2014.