Liberdade e temporalidade na fenomenologia da percepção de Maurice Merleau-Ponty
Arquivos
Data
2014-12-15
Autores
Zanfra, Beatriz Viana de Araujo [UNIFESP]
Orientadores
Carrasco, Alexandre de Oliveira Torres [UNIFESP]
Tipo
Dissertação de mestrado
Título da Revista
ISSN da Revista
Título de Volume
Resumo
Na obra A estrutura do comportamento, de 1942, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, por meio da noção
de estrutura, combate o naturalismo e o intelectualismo, mostrando que o corpo não é um
agregado de músculos e de nervos que opera de acordo com a causalidade mecânica e
funcional e que a consciência reflexiva não é a única forma da consciência e nem sua primeira
manifestação, mas sim dependente da consciência perceptiva e indiscernível do corpo como
princípio estruturante. Nesse sentido, no capítulo destinado à questão das relações da alma e
do corpo, Merleau-Ponty mostra que todos os problemas a esse respeito se reduzem ao
problema da percepção, entendida como "o ato que nos faz conhecer existências" e vê a
necessidade da filosofia transcendental ser redefinida a fim de integrar nela o fenômeno do
real, sendo tal filosofia a fenomenologia, com a investigação da percepção desempenhando
um papel fundamental nela. Em Fenomenologia da Percepção, de 1945, Merleau-Ponty
retoma o problema das relações da alma e do corpo abordado no livro anterior, mostrando que
a temporalidade resolve tal problema, pois a ideia de subjetividade como temporalidade nos
permite ver que o para-si, a revelação de si a si, é o vazio no qual o tempo se faz, e o mundo
"em si", que é o horizonte de nosso presente, fazem o problema redundar em saber como um
ser que é porvir e passado tenha também um presente, o que acaba suprimindo o problema, já
que o porvir, o passado e o presente estão ligados no movimento de temporalização. Sendo
assim, a solução de todos os problemas de transcendência se encontra na espessura do
presente pré-objetivo, onde encontramos, entre outras coisas, o fundamento de nossa
liberdade.
On the work The structure of behavior (1942) Maurice Merleau-Ponty, through the notion of structure, combats naturalism and intellectualism, showing that the body is not an aggregate of muscles and nerves that operates according to mechanical and functional causalities and showing that the reflective consciousness is not the only form of consciousness and is not its first manifestation, but dependent on perceptual consciousness and indiscernible of body as a structuring principle. Accordingly, on the chapter dedicated to the question of the relation between soul and body, Merleau-Ponty shows that all problems in this regard are reduced to the problem of perception, which is understood as "the act that makes us know existences" and sees the need for transcendental philosophy be redefined in order to integrate the phenomenon of reality. This philosophy is the phenomenology, with the research of perception playing a key role in it. On Phenomenology of Perception (1945) Merleau-Ponty takes up the question of the relation between soul and body covered in the previous book, showing that the temporality solves this problem because the idea of subjectivity as temporality allows us to see that the for-itself, the revelation of self to self, is the emptiness in which time is done, and the world "in itself", which is the horizon of our present, make the problem redound to know how a being that is future and past has also a present, eliminating the problem, because the future, the past and the present are linked in the movement of temporalization. Thus, the solution of all problems of transcendence is in the thickness of the pre-objective present, where we can find, among other things, the foundation of our liberty.
On the work The structure of behavior (1942) Maurice Merleau-Ponty, through the notion of structure, combats naturalism and intellectualism, showing that the body is not an aggregate of muscles and nerves that operates according to mechanical and functional causalities and showing that the reflective consciousness is not the only form of consciousness and is not its first manifestation, but dependent on perceptual consciousness and indiscernible of body as a structuring principle. Accordingly, on the chapter dedicated to the question of the relation between soul and body, Merleau-Ponty shows that all problems in this regard are reduced to the problem of perception, which is understood as "the act that makes us know existences" and sees the need for transcendental philosophy be redefined in order to integrate the phenomenon of reality. This philosophy is the phenomenology, with the research of perception playing a key role in it. On Phenomenology of Perception (1945) Merleau-Ponty takes up the question of the relation between soul and body covered in the previous book, showing that the temporality solves this problem because the idea of subjectivity as temporality allows us to see that the for-itself, the revelation of self to self, is the emptiness in which time is done, and the world "in itself", which is the horizon of our present, make the problem redound to know how a being that is future and past has also a present, eliminating the problem, because the future, the past and the present are linked in the movement of temporalization. Thus, the solution of all problems of transcendence is in the thickness of the pre-objective present, where we can find, among other things, the foundation of our liberty.
Descrição
Citação
ZANFRA, Beatriz Viana de Araujo. Liberdade e temporalidade na fenomenologia da percepção de Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 2014. 159 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) – Escola de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas, Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP), Guarulhos, 2014.