Navegando por Palavras-chave "Disjuntivismo"

Agora exibindo 1 - 2 de 2
  • Nenhuma Miniatura disponível
    Item
    Somente Metadadados
    O disjuntivismo fenomênico como defesa do realismo ingênuo
    (Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP), 2019-08-07) Goncalves, Daniel Borgoni [UNIFESP]; Smith, Plinio Junqueira [UNIFESP]; Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP)
    The thesis deals with the nature of visual perceptual experiences analyzing if phenomenal disjunctivism achieves its goal, that is, to defend naïve realism. Phenomenal disjunctivism is a theory of perception according to which hallucinations and veridical perceptions do not share the same phenomenal character, even though hallucinations seem introspectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptions. Naïve realism is a conception according to which physical objects and their properties determine and constitute veridical perceptual experience. Hence, the phenomenal character of veridical perception would be fulfilled only with physical objects. The terms of art above and rival theories of disjunctivism will be presented and commented to giving us a background of the debate over which this thesis belongs. Following we deal with naïve realism specifically presenting theoretical commitment that phenomenal disjunctivists should adhere. Then we deal with the causal argument from hallucination, the main threat to naïve realism, according to which we could reproduce the experience that occurs in veridical perception without physical objects. Hence, hallucinations would have the same phenomenology of matching veridical perceptions. To defend that veridical perceptions have a sui generis phenomenal character, phenomenal disjunctivists give three kinds of responses that characterizing the following phenomenal disjunctivisms: negative disjunctivism, eliminativist disjunctivism and positive disjunctivism. We will analyze both pro and contra arguments regarding with these three kinds of disjunctivism and we will defend that none achieves its goal. In other words, this thesis defends that negative disjunctivism, eliminativist disjunctivism and positive disjunctivism are not suitable strategies to defend naïve realism.
  • Nenhuma Miniatura disponível
    Item
    Somente Metadadados
    Disjuntivismo: Principais Tipos E Críticas
    (Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP), 2017-06-21) Mota, Thiago Leite [UNIFESP]; Smith, Plinio Junqueira [UNIFESP]; Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP)
    Disjunctivism as a conception refuse the traditional philosophical idea that subjective indistinguishability between veridical and non-veridical perceptions (illusions and alucinations) gives as a result either the identity between the respective perceptual states, or the equivalency between the reasons offered for each one of them to sustain perceptual beliefs. Thus, the disjunctive conception of experience has implications about the nature of perception as well as scepticism about external world, a scepticism that bases itself precisely on the same kind of indistinguishability. On the present master thesis, one present how disjunctivism intends accomplish this double refusing task. On philosphy of perception, on the discussion about the nature of perception with defenders of causal theory of perception, Paul Snowdon argues, only instrumentaly, that veridical and non-veridical perceptions produce essentially distinct perceptual states, since they don't share a common element. Therefore, his version of disjunctivism is called metaphisical disjunctivism. On Theory of Knowledge, in the clash against the sceptics, Committed to the highest common factor conception, John McDowell in turn supports that veridical perceptions, contrary to mere appearances, yield indefeasible justification to perceptual beliefs by putting us in direct contact with the facts made manifest int the world, thereby can fundament a legitimate alegation of knowledge; so his conception gets the name of epistemological disjunctivism. From their respective formulations, both Snowdon and McDowell are confronted by reactions to their respective versions of disjunctivism. Thus, in this perspective, Snowdon debates, first, with William Child, about the possibility of compatibility between disjunctivism and causalism; then with Fish, about the nature of the dispute between disjunctivists and non-disjunctivists. On the other hand, McDowell debates initially with Tyler Burge as to which perceptual conception is better, anti-individualism or disjunctivism; next Crispin Wright and Duncan Pritchard discuss with McDowell the putative victory of disjunctivism over scepticism.